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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Jurisdiction is conferred on this court pursuant to Utah 
Code Annotated § 78-2-2(3 )( j ) . 
ISSDES PRESENTED AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
1. ISSUE: Whether the trial court erred in failing to 
give plaintiffs' requested instruction on the statutory duty of 
defendant Allen to yield right-of-way when making a turn to the 
left and whether the trial court erred by giving an instruction 
on unavoidable accident requested by defendant. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW; Whether the trial court properly 
instructed the jury is a question of law which will be reviewed 
for correctness only, giving them no particular deference. Crane 
v. Timberbrook Village Ltd., 774 P. 2d 3 (Utah App. 1989). The 
party is entitled to have his theories of the case submitted to 
the jury provided there is competent evidence to support themf 
and failure to give requested instructions is reversible error if 
it tends to misled the jury to the prejudice of the complaining 
party or erroneously advises them on the law. Mikkelsen v. 
Haslamy 764 P.2d 1384 (Utah App. 1988). 
2. ISSUE: Whether the trial court erred in granting 
defendants 12 peremptory challenges against four for plaintiffs 
and whether the trial court erred in allowing the exercise of 
alternate peremptories against the entire panel of jurors instead 
of exclusively against the alternates under Rule 47(e). 
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STANDARD OF REVIEW: T h i s a p p e a r s to be a case of f i r s t 
impress ion cons t ru ing U.R.C.P. Rule 47(e) in a case with m u l t i p l e 
d e f e n d a n t s . We urge a s tandard s i m i l a r to t h a t app l ied by t h e 
Co lo rado c o u r t s wherein i t has been held r e v e r s i b l e e r r o r if a 
t r i a l cou r t g r a n t s peremptory c h a l l e n g e s in excess of the number 
allowed under a r u l e almost i d e n t i c a l to U.R.C.P. 47(e) even if 
no p r e j u d i c e r e s u l t s . Koustas Rea l ty , I n c . v . Regency Square 
P a r t n e r s h i p , 724 P.2d 97 (Colo. App. 1986) . 
3 . ISSUE: Whether the t r i a l c o u r t improper ly admitted 
o p i n i o n t e s t i m o n y as a r e c o n s t r u c t i o n exper t from one of the 
i n v e s t i g a t i n g o f f i c e r s regard ing what occurred a t the time of the 
c o l l i s i o n and c o n c e r n i n g who had the r i g h t - o f - w a y p r i o r to 
c o l l i s i o n . 
STANDARD OR REVIEW: I t i s w i t h i n the d i s c r e t i o n of the 
t r i a l cour t to determine the s u i t a b i l i t y of e x p e r t tes t imony in a 
case and t h e q u a l i f i c a t i o n s of t h e p roposed e x p e r t w i t n e s s . 
S t a t e v . Espinoza, 723 P.2d 420 (Utah 1986) . In the absence of a 
c l e a r showing of abuse , the t r i a l c o u r t ' s d e c i s i o n w i l l not be 
r e v e r s e d . Lamb v . Bangar t , 525 P.2d 602 (Utah 1974) . 
4 . ISSUE: W h e t h e r t he t r i a l c o u r t e r r e d in deny ing 
p l a i n t i f f s t h e o p p o r t u n i t y t o f u l l y r e b u t d e f e n d a n t ' s 
r e c o n s t r u c t i o n e x p e r t . 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: I t i s e r r o r for the t r i a l cour t to 
r e f u s e to p e r m i t a r e b u t t a l wi tness to p r e s e n t evidence whose 
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clear purpose is to contradict and disprove evidence presented by 
the other side. Morrison v. Air California, 699 P. 2d 600 (Nev. 
1985). Exclusion of proper rebuttal evidence must result in 
prejudice. Board of Education of South Sanpete v. Bartonf 617 
P.2d 347 (Utah 1980). 
5. ISSUE: Whether counsel for defendant made prejudicial 
comments to the jury in his opening statement and whether the 
trial court erred by failing to grant a mistrial or properly 
instruct the jury regarding the comments. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: Prejudicial comments to a jury are not 
grounds for reversal unless the court determines that they affect 
the fundamental fairness of the trial and that a different result 
might have occurred if the comments had not been made. Jones v. 
Carvell, 641 P.2d 105 (Utah 1982). 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
I. Utah Rules of Civil Procedure: 
Rule 47. Jurors. 
(a) Not Applicable. 
(b) Alternate jurors. The court may direct that one or two 
jurors in addition to the regular panel be called and 
impanelled to sit as alternate jurors. Alternate jurors in 
the order in which they are called shall replace jurors whof 
prior to the time the jury retires to consider its verdict, 
become unable or disqualified to perform their duties. 
Alternate jurors shall be drawn in the same manner, shall 
have the same qualifications, shall be subject to the same 
examination and challenges, shall take the same oathf and 
shall have the same functions, powers, facilities, and 
privileges as the principal jurors. An alternate juror who 
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does not replace a principal juror shall be discharged after 
the jury retires to consider its verdict. If one or two 
alternate jurors are called each party is entitled to one 
peremptory challenge in addition to those otherwise allowed. 
The additional peremptory challenge may be used only against 
an alternate juror, and the other peremptory challenges 
allowed by law shall not be used against the alternates. 
(c) Challenge defined; by whoa made. A challenge is an 
objection made to the trial jurors and may be directed (1) 
to the panel or (2) to an individual juror. Either party 
may challenge the jurors, but where there are several 
parties on either sidef they must join in a challenge before 
it can be made. 
(d) Not Applicable. 
(e) Challenges to individual jurors; number of peremptory 
challenges. The challenges to individual jurors are either 
peremptory or for cause. Each party shall be entitled to 
three peremptory challenges, except as provided under 
Subdivisions (b) and (c) of this rule. 
II. Utah Code Annotated: 
Section 41-6-69. Turning - Signals - Stopping or sudden 
decrease in speed - Signal flashing prohibited. (1) No 
person shall turn a vehicle or move right or left upon a 
roadway unless and until such movement can be made with 
reasonable safety not without giving an appropriate signal 
in the manner hereinafter provided. 
(2) A signal of intention to turn right or left or to 
change lanes shall be given continuously for at least the 
last three seconds preceding the beginning of the turn or 
change. 
III. Utah Code Annotated: 
Section 41-6-73. Vehicle turning left. The driver of a 
vehicle intending to turn to the left within an intersection or 
into an alley, private road, or driveway shall yield the right-
of-way to any vehicle approaching from the opposite direction 
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which is within the intersection or so close to the turning 
vehicle as to constitute an immediate hazard. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
References to exhibi ts herein are shown as "(Ex.)" followed 
by the e x h i b i t numbers. Since the e x h i b i t s were numbered 
c o n s e c u t i v e l y , p r e f ixe s such as "P" and "D" were o m i t t e d . 
References to the record are shown as " (R. )" followed by the 
c l e r k ' s page number. Since the clerk only paginated the f i r s t 
page of each of the five volumes of t r ansc r ip t — record pages 
872-876 — t r ansc r ip t r e f e r e n c e s are r e f e r r e d to by the page 
number of the t r ansc r ip t volume in the record, followed by the 
page number of the t r ansc r ip t i t s e l f . For Example, "(R. 872, p . 
84)" r e f e r s to page 84 of the f i r s t volume of the t r a n s c r i p t . 
All s t a t u t o r y r e f e r ences are to Utah Code Ann. ( 1 9 5 3 ) , as 
amended. 
A, Nature and Disposition of the Case 
This case i s a wrongful death a c t i o n a r i s i n g from an 
automobile c o l l i s i o n . Action was brought a g a i n s t the other 
d r ive r , Carl Hunter Allen (hereinaf ter "defendant A l l e n " ) , for 
neg l igence in ope ra t ing his pickup truck. Action was brought 
a g a i n s t the government defendants for n e g l i g e n t de s ign and 
maintenance of the in te rsec t ion at which the co l l i s i on occurred. 
A jury t r i a l commenced on August 8, 1988. P l a i n t i f f s s e t t l e d 
with the government defendants during the second day of t r i a l , 
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and they were dismissed as p a r t i e s to the s u i t . The t r i a l 
proceeded to verd ic t between the p l a i n t i f f s and defendant Allen 
on ly . The ju ry found the p a r t i e s ' r e s p e c t i v e negl igence as 
follows: P l a i n t i f f s ' decedent 80%f Sal t Lake County 11%, State 
of Utah 9%, and defendant Allen 0%. See Appendix A. The jury 
awarded defendant Allen damages for loss of his truck and other 
small amounts. The amendments to the judgment were for the 
p u r p o s e of d e l e t i n g t h e s e damages b e c a u s e , c o n t r a r y to 
representa t ions of defendant ' s counsel at t r i a l (R. 872f p . 7 ) , 
defendant Allen 's insurance ca r r i e r had already been reimbursed 
by p l a i n t i f f s ' ca r r i e r pr ior to t r i a l . 
B. Statement of Facts 
The co l l i s ion in question occurred on Wasatch Blvd at the 
i n t e r s e c t i o n w i t h t h e t e m p o r a r y end of I n t e r s t a t e 215 
(approximately 4800 South) in the ear ly afternoon of March 13, 
1985.1 The weather was clear and dry. An ae r i a l photograph of 
the i n t e r s e c t i o n r o u t i n e l y taken by UDOT s h o r t l y a f t e r t he 
c o l l i s i o n was introduced as Exhibit 2. 
The speed l imi t in both d i r ec t i ons on Wasatch Blvd was 40 
mph (p . 688). As can be seen from the ae r i a l photograph, Wasatch 
1 The in te rsec t ion was b u i l t by UDOT in 1968-1969 (R. 874, 
p . 346). I t was temporary in the sense t h a t i t was to serve 
temporarily un t i l 1-215 was completed, which was delayed several 
years . The in te rsec t ion was closed after t h i s co l l i s i on and now 
no longer ex i s t s as a r e s u l t of the completion of 1-215. 
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of the c o l l i s i o n f the l e f t tu rn arrow and the word "Only" for the 
northbound l e f t t u rn onto 1-215 had almost complete ly worn off . 
Compare Ex. 21 taken e a r l i e r with Ex. 14 taken a t the time of the 
c o l l i s i o n . Also, the s top bar a t the s top sign in the southbound 
l a n e had been extended only ac ros s the l e f t t u rn lane and not 
ac ross the lane for t r a f f i c con t inu ing south (Ex. 7 ) . 
The defendant Allen was t r a v e l i n g northbound on Wasatch a t 
about 1:30 pm on March 13 , 1985. He was alone in h i s 3/4 ton 
1978 Ford p i ckup (R. 872 , p p . 101-102) . He had go t t en up a t 
about 4:15 t h a t morning in order to g e t to work by 5:30 am a t the 
70 th South Monroe p l a n t where he f i l l e d cement t r u c k s . He had 
been employed by Monroe for 33 y e a r s , most ly a t the Beck S t r e e t 
p l a n t , but r e c e n t l y a t the 70th South p l a n t . When working a t the 
70th South p l a n t h i s normal route was to g e t onto Wasatch from I -
215 a t t h i s same i n t e r s e c t i o n in the morning, and to ge t onto I -
215 from Wasatch in the a f t e rnoon . At the time of the c o l l i s i o n 
he was headed home by h i s normal route a f t e r h i s s h i f t a t the 
p l a n t (R. 872, pp . 98-103) . He was on Minipress medica t ion for 
h i g h b lood p r e s s u r e and a s p i r i n due to open h e a r t surgery 10 
months before (R. 872, p . 101) . 
P l a i n t i f f ' s d e c e d e n t Rosan R a n d l e ( h e r e i n a f t e r "Mrs . 
Randle11) was southbound on Wasatch a t the time of the c o l l i s i o n . 
She was a lone in her husband ' s 1983 Honda Accord. After dropping 
her husband off in S a l t Lake, she had planned to make s e v e r a l 
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s t o p s shopping for a new house t h a t she and her husband were 
b u i l d i n g . One of these appointments was with a woman who made 
d r a p e r i e s who l ived fu r the r south on Wasatch. She was appa ren t l y 
headed the re at the time of the acc iden t (R. 874, pp. 417-419) . 
She was 28 yea r s o ld f had good e y e s i g h t , good d r iv ing h a b i t s f and 
she obeyed t r a f f i c s igns and s i g n a l s (R. 874, pp. 365-366, 370-
371, 376, 417; Ex. 93 ) . 
There were no eyewi tnesses to the c o l l i s i o n . Mrs. Randle 
was unconscious a t the scene and was pronounced dead before she 
was ever able to g ive her ve r s i on of what happened p r i o r to the 
c o l l i s i o n . The defendant Allen could not expla in what happened 
because he was not paying a t t e n t i o n . He c la ims h i s a t t e n t i o n was 
on the road: " . . . I had to keep my eye on the highway b e c a u s e 
y o u ' r e coming to th is—where you fve got to come up and drop off 
on to 215. You c a n ' t take your eyes off for very l o n g . " (R. 872, 
p . 109, 111) . He saw d e c e d e n t ' s Honda r i g h t a t the i n s t a n t of 
impact and n e i t h e r appl ied h i s brakes nor took any other ac t ion 
to avoid the a c c i d e n t (R. 872 , p . I l l , 1 1 6 ) . P r i o r to the 
c o l l i s i o n , he claims he glanced up the road and saw a " t o u r i n g 
c a r " t h a t , in p r e p a r a t i o n for t r i a l , he now bel ieved was about 
150 fee t nor th of the s top sign when he was about 300 feet south 
of where the c o l l i s i o n occurred (374 f e e t south of s t op s ign) (R. 
872, pp. 106-107, 130; Ex. 19 ) . There were no s k i d marks for 
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e i t h e r v e h i c l e before impact (R. 873, p . 176) . Both the car and 
the t ruck were demolished beyond r e p a i r . 
From the photographs taken by i n v e s t i g a t i n g o f f i c e r s a t the 
scene , i t i s obvious t h a t defendant Allen turned in to t h e l e f t 
f ron t of the Honda with a tremendous force and planed up over the 
hood, s l i c i n g the Honda's windshie ld along i t s l e n g t h w i t h t h e 
t r u c k ' s r i g h t bumper (Ex. 1 0 - 1 3 ) . The impact from the t ruck 
forced the honda down to where i t s frame gouged the road and spun 
t h e Honda c o m p l e t e l y 135 d e g r e e s p o i n t i n g back almost in the 
d i r e c t i o n from which i t had come (Ex. 6, 16-17; R. 873, pp. 174, 
2 5 6 ) . Blood on the Honda windsh ie ld , coupled with the f ac t t h a t 
t he d e c e d e n t ' s in jury was to her r i g h t forehead , s u g g e s t s t h a t 
the t ruck bumper impacted with Mrs. Rand le ' s head. (Ex. 12 and 
39; R. 874, p . 4 2 2 ; R. 872 , p . 1 4 5 ) . She d i ed o f f i c i a l l y of 
t r a u m a to the head (Ex. 3 9 ) . She had no o t h e r s u r f a c e or 
i n t e r n a l i n j u r i e s o ther than a minor f r a c t u r e in her r i g h t a n k l e , 
c o n s i s t e n t w i th a low speed for her car a t t h e t ime of t h e 
a c c i d e n t (Ex. 39; R. 874, pp. 421-422) . Defendant Allen l o s t a 
week 's work due to in jured r i b s but incurred no medical expenses 
(R. 875, p . 598) . 
The po in t of impact was 69 f ee t south in to the i n t e r s e c t i o n 
(74 f e e t s o u t h of t h e s t o p s i g n ) (R. 8 7 3 , p p . 1 8 4 , 2 4 5 ) . 
P l a i n t i f f s ' r e c o n s t r u c t i o n e x p e r t , Dr. Reynold Watkins from Utah 
S t a t e U n i v e r s i t y , c a l c u l a t e d the speed of the Honda a t 16-19 mph 
10 
' R . 373 wgp unr«. . ,; : .i\ d 
w^~ c o n s i s t e n t : : r ? , .^i s c c e l e r a * ion -r^m : • • i l l 5 too r e f o r e 
j i a c e d 
: 13 s p e e d or p i c k u p i- 4 5 - 5 0 *.-:. «. , ^ c was 
' ! r ^ n r i c r ' ^ ' ./1 r w i a f o n H wn *- *, i 1 Pf ' -? -acMiTionv w h e r e i n h-** ^ 1 a i m s 
. •> * 
3 o t ,; ^ r l -~* :n<i ' e f e n d a n t ' s r e c o n s t r u c t i o n e x p e r t s a g r e e d 
"a no It; ^- ' " * - ^ ^ t e r s e c t i o n f i r s t (R. 8 7 6 , pp . 6 6 6 -
.: J > . ^ R a i i d ] a s t o pp e d a t 11 i = • 31 - :> p s ii g i l , 
^he was .* . t e r s e c t ion i f u l l f i v e s e c o n d s b e f o r e i m p a c t a t 
• ii ' i i >f i >] 1 ii = ii i )i (R 8 ; 3 , IE: • 2 76 ) . 
Unde: M - . -.; : d e f e n d a n t A l l e n ' s s p e e d , I le w a s 
^
Q u a r q l
 h u n d r e d f e e t ^own M P r o a d when M r s . H a n d l e e n t e r e d t h e 
i ; 
".65 f e e t a t 35 mni: ';;. - »» • - l e f e n d a n t *\rxa CIM a c t e d 
. 1 . ^ • Lena L .v . , . . ^. r . " 
^ p n e ' T ; ^ - . i* i i v e l m g a o o u t 28 
- j a. v en he r 
1 G S S L a u n ^ o>w.C J » v 1 J . 
H - d e f e n d a n t M j en w* , l ' * :*/<* been * - r w ^ : u ! f e i ~~ 
j no t - i a n a l , 
• u s t th r *^ » s ^ c u n o ; e t j L e uupa L , : J - n " ° r * e *-
s o u t h «.—
 4*ww ^ ww ^n : r . t * « f t t - i r . l a n e , ^nd hz.. \n*\ w-u] * 
11 
have been t o t a l l y unaware of h i s i n t e n t i o n to tu rn l e f t . She 
would have had even l e s s time to r e a l i z e t h a t defendant was not 
going to y i e ld her the r i g h t - o f - w a y . Defendant Allen t e s t i f i e d 
a t h i s d e p o s i t i o n t h a t he could not remember whether he s igna led 
or n o t . At t r i a l he changed h i s s t o r y and t e s t i f i e d t h a t he was 
p r e t t y sure t h a t he did s i g n a l (R. 872, pp. 112-116) . 
The f i r s t person a t the scene a f t e r the acc iden t was a t ruck 
d r i v e r named B r e t t E l l i s ( h e r e i n a f t e r " E l l i s " ) . E l l i s was 
d r i v i n g a 2500 g a l l o n tank t ruck loaded with propane up 1-215 
headed toward Alta to make d e l i v e r i e s (R. 872, pp . 131-133) . He 
n o t i c e d a Honda on Wasatch heading southbound a t about 4400 or 
4500 South (R. 872, pp. 133 -134) . He was v e r y u n s u r e of t h e 
r e l a t i v e p o s i t i o n s of h i s t ruck and the Honda (Ex. 87; R. 872, 
pp. 138-139, 142, 154, 158-160) . The t ruck he was d r iv ing was 
t o p - h e a v y and loaded with v o l a t i l e fuel (R. 872, pp . 136-137) . 
At about 4500 South he s t a r t e d gear ing h i s t ruck down to 20-25 
mph to n e g o t i a t e the end of 1-215, which dipped down sharp ly and 
then went in to a l e f t - h a n d , u p - h i l l curve to Wasatch (R. 872, pp . 
136-137) . At p a r a l l e l p o i n t s on Wasatch and 1-215 nor th of the 
i n t e r s e c t i o n , the d i s t a n c e to the i n t e r s e c t i o n on 1-215 be ing 
t r a v e l e d by E l l i s was approximate ly 200 f e e t longer (R. 873, pp . 
326-327) . 
As E l l i s a r r i v e d a t the i n t e r s e c t i o n approximate ly p a r a l l e l 
with the p o i n t of impact , he heard a no i se l i k e a shotgun b l a s t 
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(Ex. 87; R. 872, p . 140). He looked to his side and saw the 
truck spinning out and the Honda careening sideways and spinning 
around (R. 872
 f p . 140). He pulled his truck over and ran back 
to give ass is tance (R. 872f p . 143). 
At the beginning of t r i a l the court determined that each of 
the pa r t i e s should be allowed 4 peremptory challenges against the 
e n t i r e v e n i r e , g iv ing the defendants a t o t a l of 12 and the 
p l a i n t i f f s 4. This t r i a l judge had an unfor tuna te h a b i t of 
invi t ing counsel into off-record d i scuss ions , and defendants made 
t h e i r r eques t s for a d d i t i o n a l peremptor ies during one such 
d i s c u s s i o n . There fo re , no record of the defendant 's request , 
p l a i n t i f f s ' object ions , or the c o u r t ' s ruling were made at the 
t ime. However, after the pa r t i e s had indicated their peremptory 
challenges but before they were announced to the jury , and before 
any j u ro r was dismissed or sworn, p l a i n t i f f s entered t h e i r 
objection on the record to the procedure as being pre judic ia l and 
contrary to rule (R. 872, pp. 11-12). The challenges e f fec t ive ly 
allowed the defendants to impanel a jury of a l l middle-aged men— 
those most l i ke ly to be sympathetic with defendant Allen. The 
court overruled p l a i n t i f f s ' objections (R. 872, pp. 18-19). This 
issue is discussed more fully in Point I I , in f ra . 
As the t r i a l began, counsel for defendant Allen made a 
thoroughly argumenta t ive opening statement, but in pa r t i cu la r 
made the following pre judic ia l statements (R. 872, p . 88): 
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" I t ' s important to me and to my case and Mr. 
Al len 's case t h a t you ge t a sense of what 
kind of a person Mr. Allen i s . Mr. Allen is 
a person probably very much l ike a l l of you 
on the j u r y . He's married
 f worked for the 
same company for some 33 y e a r s . He has 
ch i ldren . He is j u s t one of us . 
One of the things tha t you as jurors wi l l do 
to determine the c r e d i b i l i t y of wi tnesses , 
and that means t e l l i n g the t r u t h , and can 
they be t rus t ed . Mr. Al len ' s c r e d i b i l i t y i s 
very important and I think as you get to know 
him through the limited way you will on the 
stand, you ' l l come to understand he ' s a good 
man. He's trying to t e l l you the t ruth as to 
what happened. 
Now, one thing I would also ask you to do is 
have a l i t t l e empathy for Mr. Allen as he 
s i t s on that stand. He's not used to being 
confronted by peop le . This i s an awful f 
awful scary expe r i ence for him. He ' l l be 
nervous and sometimes h e ' l l have a l i t t l e 
d i f f i c u l t y expressing himself. I ' l l ask you 
to bear with him and l i s t e n to what h e ' s 
s ay ing , because if you do you ' l l understand 
what happened." 
At the end of d e f e n d a n t ' s argument, P l a i n t i f f s ' counsel 
objected to these comments and moved for a m i s t r i a l outside the 
presence of the jury (R. 872, pp. 95-96). The court took the 
motion under advisement and l a t e r denied i t . This i s sue i s 
discussed more fully in Point V, in f ra . 
During the t r i a l , the court allowed over objec t ion one of 
the invest igat ing of f icers to t e s t i f y as an expert reconstruct ion 
witness as to what had occurred and who had the right-of-way in 
the in t e r sec t ion . The witness ' t ra in ing was l imi ted , and he was 
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not able to reconstruct the collision. He did not know the 
relative positions of the car and truck and his testimony 
consisted of pure speculation. The facts related to this 
assignment of error are more fully explained in Point III infra. 
Also during the trial, counsel for defendant Allen presented 
expert witness Newell Knight, who testified, making certain 
assumptions based principally on the testimony of Ellis, that 
Mrs. Randle could not have stopped at the stop sign. When 
Plaintiffs tried to present the rebuttal testimony of Dr. Watkins 
to lay bare the unreasonable assumptions and his opinion that 
Mrs. Randle could easily have stopped, the Court refused to allow 
most of the rebuttal. The facts related to this assignment of 
error are more fully explained in Point IV infra. 
Plaintiffs also assign as error various instructions that 
the court gave or failed to give to the jury. These are more 
fully discussed in Point I infra. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
1. The t r i a l court failed to give an ins t ruc t ion requested 
by p l a i n t i f f s as to the s t a t u t o r y duty of defendant Allen to 
yield right-of-way to a car within the in te r sec t ion in question. 
This l e f t the jury without f u l l i n s t r u c t i o n s as to the l ega l 
dut ies of both pa r t i e s and le f t them with an insuff ic ient basis 
on which to judge respect ive negligence of the p a r t i e s and to 
determine which of the pa r t i e s had the right-of-way. This was a 
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c r i t i c a l omission because a number of other ins t ruc t ions rested 
upon a determination of which as to the p a r t i e s 
had the r i g h t - o f - w a y . The fac t t h a t the j u r y ass igned no 
negligence to defendant Allen after he admitted he was not paying 
a t t en t ion prior to the c o l l i s i o n , i s evidence tha t the jury was 
m i s l e d . The c o u r t a l s o gave an " u n a v o i d a b l e a c c i d e n t " 
ins t ruc t ion to the jury tha t was requested by defendant. Such an 
ins t ruc t ion i s m i s l e a d i n g , cumula t ive , and was not j u s t i f i e d 
under the circumstances of t h i s case. I t i s an ins t ruc t ion that 
should be eliminated from use. 
2. The t r i a l cour t v i o l a t e d Rule 47(e) by granting the 
defendants a combined t o t a l of 12 peremptory challenges against 4 
allowed to p l a i n t i f f s and by allowing the exercise of a l t e rna te 
peremptories against the en t i r e jury panel . 
3. The t r i a l cour t abused i t s d i s c r e t i o n in allowing 
Deputy Haggin, one of the i n v e s t i g a t i n g o f f i c e r s , to express 
op in ions on what happened at the scene and which pa r t i e s had 
right-of-way. Such testimony required a reconstruct ion of what 
happened p r i o r to the a c c i d e n t . Deputy Haggin had l imi ted 
reconstruct ion t r a in ing , l imited formal t ra in ing in school, and 
he was n o t , in f a c t , ab le to r e c o n s t r u c t t h i s accident after 
trying for many hours. His opinions were, t h e r e f o r e , t o t a l l y 
s p e c u l a t i v e . No proper foundat ion was l a i d e i t h e r for h i s 
exper t ise or that his opinions were based upon matters tha t are 
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normally re l ied upon by experts in the f i e ld . Timely objections 
to foundation were made on s eve ra l occas ions by counsel for 
p l a i n t i f f s . His opinions were pre jud ic ia l because th i s case is 
one where the pa r t i e s have to re ly upon experts to describe what 
happened at the scene of the acc iden t because there were no 
eyewitnesses. 
4. The t r i a l court abused i t s d i sc re t ion by not allowing 
p l a i n t i f f s to f u l l y r e b u t t h e t e s t i m o n y of d e f e n d a n t ' s 
reconstruct ion expert offered on defendant 's case in chief. The 
t r i a l c o u r t ' s r u l i n g s t h a t p l a i n t i f f s ' e x p e r t had e i t h e r 
presented that evidence during p l a i n t i f f s case in chief or had an 
opportunity to do so were in e r ror . The testimony of defendant 's 
expert was heard for the f i r s t time by p l a i n t i f f s and p l a i n t i f f s ' 
expert during the t r i a l . Therefore, no r e b u t t a l was or could 
have been given to defendant 's evidence un t i l the time that i t 
was offered. 
5. Defendant Al len ' s a t torney made pre judic ia l comments to 
the ju ry during h i s opening s ta tement t h a t were designed to 
arouse the sympathies of the jury for defendant Allen. I t i s 
unlikely that t h i s court wil l reverse the t r i a l cour t on t h i s 
b a s i s a l o n e , but the comments were p r e jud i c i a l , espec ia l ly in 
l igh t of the cumulative na tu re of the many e r r o r s i nv i t ed by 
counsel for defendant Allen. These e r ro rs deserve condemnation. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I . 
THE T R I A L COURT IMPROPERLY 
INSTRUCTED THE JURY. 
The t r i a l c o u r t heard t h e a rgumen t s of c o u n s e l on t h e 
i n s t r u c t i o n s o f f - r eco rd before i n s t r u c t i n g the j u r y (R. 876, p . 
714) . The p a r t i e s were then allowed to record t h e i r o b j e c t i o n s 
a f t e r the j u r y r e t i r e d (R. 876f pp . 754-761) . 
The Utah Court of Appeals has held in Crane v . Timberbrook 
V i l l a g e , L t d . , 774 P.2d 3 (Utah App. 1989) t h a t : 
"Whether the t r i a l cour t p rope r ly i n s t r u c t e d 
the j u r y i s a ques t i on of law. Mikkelsen v . 
Haslam, 764 P.2d 1384, 1387 (Ut. App. 1988) . 
We, t h e r e f o r e , r e v i e w t h e t r i a l c o u r t ' s 
i n s t r u c t i o n s for c o r r e c t n e s s o n l y , g i v i n g 
them no p a r t i c u l a r d e f e r e n c e . " 
The Utah Cour t of Appea l s has a l s o he ld as f o l l o w s i n 
Mikkelsen v . Haslam, 764 P.2d 1384 (Utah App. 1988): 
"A p a r t y i s e n t i t l e d to have h i s t h e o r i e s of 
the case submit ted to the j u r y provided t h e r e 
i s c o m p e t e n t e v i d e n c e t o s u p p o r t t h e m . 
S t e e l e [ v . B r e i n h o l t ] , 747 P .2d a t 435; 
Biswel l v . Duncan, 742 P.2d 80, 88 (Utah Ct . 
App. 1987); H i l l i e r v . Lamborn, 740 P.2d 300, 
302 (Utah Ct. App. 1987) . F a i l u r e to g i v e 
reques ted i n s t r u c t i o n s i s r e v e r s i b l e e r r o r if 
i t tends to misled the j u r y to the p r e j u d i c e 
of t h e c o m p l a i n i n g p a r t y or e r r o n e o u s l y 
a d v i s e s on the law. S t e e l e , 747 P. 2d a t 435; 
B i s w e l l , 742 P.2d a t 88. 
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P l a i n t i f f s submit t h a t the f a i l u r e of the court to give 
proper ins t ruc t ions on defendant Allen 's duty to yield r ight-of-
way when making a l e f t t u r n , coupled wi th the numerous 
ins t ruc t ions with regard to p l a i n t i f f s 1 decedent ' s obligat ion to 
yield right-of-way misled the jury into believing that defendant 
Allen had no duty under the circumstances. This i s the only way 
to explain why the jury assigned no negligence to defendant Allen 
even though by h i s own admission he was not keeping a proper 
lookout. 
A. THE TRIAL COURT FAILED TO PROPERLY 
INSTRUCT THE JURY CONCERNING DEPENDANT 
ALLEN'S DUTY TO YIELD RIGHT-OP-WAY TO A 
VEHICLE IN THE INTERSECTION. 
Pla in t i f f s requested that the t r i a l court ins t ruc t the jury 
as follows (R. 629; See also copy in Appendix A): 
Proposed Jury Ins t ruc t ions 
"(a) The Motor Vehicle Laws of Utah provide 
that a person may not turn l e f t on a roadway 
u n t i l the tu rn can be made with reasonable 
safety and an a p p r o p r i a t e s igna l has been 
given con t inuous ly for a t l e a s t t h ree (3) 
seconds preceding the beginning of the tu rn . 
(b) In a d d i t i o n the Motor V e h i c l e Laws 
provide tha t a driver in tending to tu rn to 
the l e f t shal l yield the right-of-way to any 
v e h i c l e a p p r o a c h i n g from t h e o p p o s i t e 
d i rec t ion which is within the in te r sec t ion or 
so c l o s e to t h e t u r n i n g v e h i c l e a s t o 
cons t i tu te an immediate hazard." 
These proposed ins t ruc t ions were based on the provisions of 
U.C.A. § 41-6-69(1) and 41-6-73 tha t were in effect a t the time 
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of the c o l l i s i o n . The per t inen t par t s of these s t a t u t e s were set 
forth in the "Determinat ive S t a t u t e s " p o r t i o n of t h i s b r i e f . 
P l a i n t i f f s ' counsel timely objected at R. 876, p . 755-756, to the 
cou r t ' s fa i lure to give t h i s i n s t ruc t ion . 
The proposed ins t ruc t ions would have informed the jury tha t 
defendant Allen had the duty to yield to Mrs. Randle and not turn 
into her if she was within the in te r sec t ion or so close to him to 
cons t i tu te an immediate hazard. 
There were obviously fac ts presented to the jury upon which 
they could have reasonably concluded Mrs. Randle had the r i gh t -
of-way and defendant Allen f a i l ed to p rope r ly y ie ld to her. 
Since E l l i s slowed his truck down and had a grea ter distance to 
t rave l to get to the i n t e r s ec t i on , had Mrs. Randle not seen the 
stop sign and had proceeded through the in te r sec t ion at the speed 
l imi t without slowing, she would have been far down the road by 
the time E l l i s arrived at the in t e r sec t ion . She was a cautious 
d r i v e r t h a t obeyed t r a f f i c r e g u l a t i o n s . If she saw the stop 
s i g n , i t would have been out of c h a r a c t e r for her to have 
disobeyed i t . Given her speed at impact and the fact that she 
was not down the road south of E l l i s , the j u r y could have 
concluded that she stopped. 
Also , by a l l accounts, she was in the in te r sec t ion before 
defendant 's truck was in the in t e r sec t ion . Since a car heading 
northbound can e i ther proceed s t r a igh t ahead or turn l e f t , i t was 
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l i k e l y t h a t defendant Allen was down the road too far for 
p l a i n t i f f s ' decedent to even know which d i rec t ion he was going to 
take before she entered the i n t e r s e c t i o n . She had a perfect 
r ight to assume that he would see her and allow her to clear the 
in te r sec t ion before turning le f t across her path. She obviously 
was also having to keep her eye on E l l i s ' l a rge propane t ruck 
coming up from 1-215 tha t she would have to immediately merge 
with. 
One second before impact, defendant Allen was s t i l l at l ea s t 
51 feet away. The jury could have concluded that she had no idea 
t h a t defendant Allen was not going to y ie ld . She was trapped. 
She had no time to reac t . She could not stop and back up. On 
the other hand
 f a l l defendant Allen had to do was not turn . He 
did not have to react because he was already going north. All he 
had to do was keep going s t ra igh t ahead. I t would have been easy 
for him to do t h i s if he had been paying a t t e n t i o n . 
The effect of the t r i a l c o u r t ' s fa i lu re to give the proposed 
ins t ruc t ion was to deprive the jury of a l l the law upon which to 
judge which of the pa r t i e s had the obl igat ion to yield r ight-of-
way within the in te r sec t ion . The jury had no way of knowing tha t 
defendant Allen even had a s t a tu to ry duty to yield the r ight-of-
way. All p l a i n t i f f s were l e f t with was the general negl igence 
i n s t r u c t i o n s . As s tated by the Court of Appeals in Mikkelsen, 
supra: "The mere giving of abs t rac t ins t ruc t ions on negligence 
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without adapting the ins t ruc t ions to the du t ies present in the 
case is e r r o r . Everts f 197 P. a t 1046-47." 
The t r i a l c o u r t t h e r e f o r e no t on ly f a i l e d to g i v e 
ins t ruc t ions on points of law relevant to p l a i n t i f f s theory of 
the case , but also failed to co r r ec t ly advise them as to the law. 
This was revers ib le e r ro r . 
F a i l u r e to g ive the proposed ins t ruc t ion was p a r t i c u l a r l y 
pre jud ic ia l in l i gh t of Ins t ruc t ion Nos. 32, 34f and 35 given by 
the cour t (Appendix A; R. 690 , 692-693). Ins t ruc t ion No. 32 
instructed the jury as to Mrs. Randle's obl igat ion to yield the 
right-of-way to any vehicle in the i n t e r s ec t i on . Ins t ruc t ion No. 
34 instructed the jury tha t the c o l l i s i o n was deemed prima facia 
evidence of Mrs. Randle's f a i lu re to yield the right-of-way and, 
fur ther , " fa i lu re to yield right-of-way to one whom the law has 
g iven the r igh t -o f -way i s n e g l i g e n c e " . I n s t r u c t i o n No. 35 
defines right-of-way and again i n s t r u c t s the jury that fa i lure to 
y i e l d to one to whom the law i s given the r i gh t -o f -way i s 
negligence. 
Ins t ruc t ion No. 34 goes on to add tha t "if you bel ieve that 
Rosan Randle failed to properly yield the r i gh t -o f -way to the 
v e h i c l e d r i v e n by Car l Hunter A l l e n , such conduc t would 
cons t i t u t e negligence on the par t of Rosan Randle." Without an 
ins t ruc t ion as to defendant Al len ' s obl iga t ion to yield r ight-of-
way and a balanced i n s t r u c t i o n t h a t i f the j u ry found t h a t 
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defendant Allen f a i l e d to p rope r ly y ie ld the right-of-way to 
p l a i n t i f f s 1 decedent, then he would be negl igent , the ju ry was 
c l e a r l y misled as to the pa r t i e s respect ive d u t i e s . Defendant 
Allen i s not held in the ins t ruc t ions to any duty with regard to 
right-of-way. 
This imbalance in the ins t ruc t ions was not los t upon counsel 
for defendant Allen. He exploited the imbalance in his closing 
argument to the jury by s ta t ing as follows (R. 876, p . 740): 
"Our case does not fold even if you believe 
she stopped at the stop sign because of the 
continuing obl igat ion to yield to my c l i e n t 
posing immediate hazard to her entering that 
in t e r sec t ion . 
I submi t to you the f a c t t h i s a c c i d e n t 
happened a l o n e , shows t h a t she was an 
immediate hazard." 
B. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GIVING AN 
UNAVOIDABLE ACCIDENT INSTRUCTION. 
I n s t r u c t i o n No. 37 ( s e e copy in Appendix A) was an 
unavoidable accident ins t ruc t ion proposed by defendant Allen. I t 
i s mis leading because i t c a s t s the terminology "unavoidable 
acc iden t " as a de f in i t ion of lack of defendant 's negligence or 
proximate cause, while those terms would c l e a r l y have another 
conno ta t ion in the minds of j u r o r s . The j u r y i s o therwise 
properly instructed on negligence and proximate cause. There i s 
no evidence in t h i s case t h a t would j u s t i f y the use of t h i s 
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instruction, and it is time to take it out of usage once and for 
all. 
POINT II. 
IT WAS PREJUDICIAL ERROR TO GRANT 
DEFENDANTS 12 PEREMPTORY CHALLENGES 
AGAINST 4 FOR PLAINTIFFS AND TO 
ALLOW THE EXERCISE OF ALTERNATE 
PEREMPTORIES AGAINST THE ENTIRE 
PANEL. 
Rule 47(e) provides tha t "each party sha l l be en t i t l ed to 
three peremptory chal lenges, except as provided under Subsections 
(b) and (c) of t h i s Rule" . Subsect ion (b) provides tha t if 
a l t e r n a t e j u r o r s are c a l l e d , "each pa r ty i s e n t i t l e d to one 
peremptory challenge in addit ion to those otherwise allowed. The 
a d d i t i o n a l peremptory cha l l enge may be used only a g a i n s t an 
a l t e rna t e juror f and the other peremptory challenges allowed by 
law shal l not be used against the a l t e rna t e s " • Subsection (c) 
p rov ides tha t "where there are several p a r t i e s on e i ther side f 
they must join in a challenge before i t can be made". 
There is nothing in the language of t h i s Rule that indicates 
tha t i t depends on the exercise of j u d i c i a l d i s c r e t i o n . We have 
found no case that i n t e r p r e t s these provisions of Rule 47 in a 
s i tua t ion involving mult iple defendants. 
The number of peremptory challenges ava i lab le to p a r t i e s in 
a c i v i l proceeding appears to be subs t an t i a l l y v a r i a b l e around 
the count ry and depends almost e n t i r e l y upon the ind iv idua l 
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statutes or rules of a particular jurisdiction. Generally, the 
courts in jurisdictions where a statute or rule requires joinder 
in challenges by parties to each sidef similar to that set out in 
Rule 47, have held that the exercise of peremptory challenges 
must be joined in by multiple plaintiffs or defendants "no matter 
whether their interests are common or antagonistic". Annotation, 
32 ALR 3d 747, Section 9[a]. There are examples to the contrary, 
however. Ibid. 
Colorado and Arizona, two nearby jurisdictions that have 
rules similar to that under consideration here, do not allow 
additional peremptory challenges in civil cases involving 
multiple defendants. For Arizona, see Horan v. Jones, 253 P. 2d 
891 (Ariz. 1953) and Penaskovic v. F.W. Woolworth Company, 513 
P.2d 692 (Ariz. App. 1973). 
In Koustas Realty, Inc. v. Regency Square Partnership, 724 
P.2d 97 (Colo. App. 1986), cert, den., the Colorado Court of 
Appeals recently reviewed a decision by a trial court to grant a 
third party defendant two additional peremptory challenges under 
a rule that provides as follows: "Each side shall be entitled to 
four peremptory challenges and, if there is more than one party 
to a side, they must join in such challenges". The Colorado 
Court reversed a judgment in favor of the defendants with the 
following language: 
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"The a l l o c a t i o n of peremptory challenges is 
p rescr ibed by C.R.C.P. 47(h) and does not 
d e p e n d on t h e e x e r c i s e of j u d i c i a l 
d i s c r e t i o n . Blades v. DaFoey 704 P.2d 317 (Colo. 1985). I t i s r e v e r s i b l e e r ro r if a 
t r i a l cour t grants peremptory challenges in 
excess of the number allowed under C.R.C.P 
47(h) even if no prejudice r e s u l t s . Blades 
v . Da Fo e , s u p r a . M u l t i p l e l i t i g a n t s 
designated as co-defendants or co -p l a in t i f f s 
are en t i t l ed to only one s e t of peremptory 
chal lenges . Blades v. DaFoe, supra. 
The Utah Supreme Court, in a divided opinion in Sutton v. 
O t i s E leva tor Co. , 249 P. 437 (Utah 1926), has construed Utah 
s t a t u t e s now repealed that were very similar in language to that 
now contained in the port ions of Rule 47 above c i t ed . The court 
held the word "side" to mean more than jus t the designation given 
to the defendants by the p l a i n t i f f . In tha t case, one of the 
defendants had p r a c t i c a l l y admitted i t s own l i a b i l i t y and was in 
concert with the p l a i n t i f f in es tab l i sh ing the l i a b i l i t y of the 
other defendant. The court noted that "[s]uch cases as the one 
a t bar are not a f requent occu r r ence" . 249 P. a t 458. The 
opinion, the re fore , can be limited to the special circumstances 
of tha t case, where the court in effect determined that one of 
the defendants was r ea l l y on the "side" of the p l a i n t i f f and not 
of the other defendant. The Sutton court made i t clear tha t in 
most cases i t would not depa r t from the s t a t u t o r y r u l e t h a t 
r e q u i r e d the m u l t i p l e d e f e n d a n t s to j o i n in one s e t of 
peremptories. The court s t a t e s at 249 P. 458: 
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" T h e r e a r e no d o u b t many c a s e s where 
defendants are joined f in which one seeks to 
blame the o ther for the wrong or injury of 
which the p l a i n t i f f c o m p l a i n s . In such 
cases , there is no subs tant ia l reason why the 
de fendan t s , for purposes of a pe remptory 
challenge, should not be considered as being 
on the same s ide" . 
The Sutton case i s , there fore , not a case that holds that 
pa r t i e s are en t i t l ed to multiple se ts of peremptory cha l l enges 
simply because their i n t e r e s t s are "adverse", or because they may 
have cross claims against each other . I t was a case of limited 
a p p l i c a b i l i t y , which the court c l ea r ly recognized and addressed 
in i t s opinion. 
The s i t u a t i o n here is not one where the defendants can be 
considered in any similar sense on d i f fe ren t " s ides" . They were 
a l l joined as j o in t t o r t feasors , and they a l l denied l i a b i l i t y . 
They a l l fi led cross claims against each other , but a l l of the i r 
c la ims were for indemnity or cont r ibut ion , except for that of 
defendant Al len , which a l so included a cause of ac t ion for 
neg l igence aga ins t the s t a t e and county to recover his small 
damages (R. 19, 28, 36) . I t can be seen from each of t h e i r 
answers t h a t they a l l a s s e r t e d e s s e n t i a l l y the same defenses 
against p l a i n t i f f s . I t can be seen from the opening statements 
of each of the p a r t i e s t h a t they were in lock s tep with each 
o ther , a l l trying to lay faul t for the co l l i s ion upon p l a i n t i f f s ' 
decedent and making no mention of t h e i r c la ims a g a i n s t each 
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other . Defendant Allen allowed his negligence claim against the 
s t a t e and county to be dismissed without recovery to a s s i s t them 
in s e t t l i n g with p l a i n t i f f s (R. 873, p . 224). Defendant Allen 
used the s t a t e ' s reconstruct ion expert as i t s own witness as the 
t r i a l continued. 
C o u r t s t h a t go down the road of a l l o w i n g a d d i t i o n a l 
peremptory challenges under s i tua t ions where mult iple defendants' 
i n t e r e s t s are "adverse" a re , f i r s t of a l l , usual ly in te rpre t ing a 
d i f fe rent type of s t a t u t e or rule tha t al lows the t r i a l cou r t 
d i s c r e t i o n . Some have held that to afford a basis for review, 
the t r i a l court should e x p r e s s l y se t fo r th in the record the 
reasons for i t s ruling and the facts on which i t re l ied in making 
i t s d e c i s i o n . See, for example, Hunsaker v. Bozeman Deaconess 
Foundat ion , 588 P. 2d 493 (Montana, 1978). The Montana Court 
g ives an i n t e r e s t i n g r e c i t a t i o n of the p r a c t i c a l problems of 
applying a s tandard t h a t p a r t i e s on a p a r t i c u l a r s i d e be 
" h o s t i l e " to e a c h o t h e r in o r d e r to g r a n t a d d i t i o n a l 
peremptories. I t s tated as follows at 588 P.2d 499: 
"The problems are magnified by the procedure 
that usually takes place . Frequently t h e r e 
i s no record or only a scanty record of what 
happened in the t r i a l c o u r t . The u s u a l 
s i t u a t i o n i s the p a r t i e s do not notify the 
cour t and opposing p a r t i e s in advance of 
t r i a l t h a t each co-defendant , for example, 
w i l l ask for four peremptory c h a l l e n g e s . 
Perhaps in some s i t u a t i o n s , the pa r t i e s do 
not d isc lose the i r in tent ions un t i l the time 
has come to s t a r t exercising the peremptory 
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chal lenges . Suddenly the court and p l a in t i f f 
i s confronted with defense motions asking to 
have four peremptory c h a l l e n g e s for each 
defendant . In many s i t u a t i o n s , the t r i a l 
court wil l be taken by surpr ise and will not 
have suf f ic ien t time to r e f l e c t on whether 
the co-defendants a r e , in fac t , " h o s t i l e " . 
The opposing p a r t y , moreover, may a l so be 
caught by s u r p r i s e and i s not prepared to 
answer to contentions of the co-defendants . 
The court i s compelled to rule without having 
the benef i t of a thorough b r i e f i n g by the 
p a r t i e s to the act ion. The r e s u l t is that 
when a case comes to us on appeal, we have no 
bas is to determine if, a t the time the t r i a l 
court made i t s ru l ing , i t was co r rec t . " 
What the court describes in the Bozeman case is exactly what 
happened in t h i s case . The defendants f i r s t requested t h e i r 
m u l t i p l e peremptories in an off- the-record discussion with the 
cour t wi thout any p r i o r no t i ce to e i t h e r the c o u r t or t h e 
p l a i n t i f f s . The request caught both the p l a i n t i f f s and the court 
off guard, and the court was put in a s i tua t ion of having to make 
an off - the-cuff decision on a matter of high importance to the 
par t ies without the bene f i t of any r e sea rch or b r i e f s by the 
p a r t i e s . We submit tha t the court should construe the provisions 
of Rule 47 similar to the Colorado court giving the language of 
the rule the full effect of what i t p la in ly says. 
In any event, the t r i a l court in t h i s case violated Rule 47 
by a l l o w i n g the d e f e n d a n t s to e x e r c i s e t h e i r a d d i t i o n a l 
peremptory challenges for a l t e rna t ive ju ro rs against the e n t i r e 
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p a n e l . There can be no question tha t t h i s was a v io la t ion of 
Rule 47. 
POINT I I I . 
THE TRIAL COURT IMPROPERLY ADMITTED 
OPINION EVIDENCE FROM ONE OP THE 
INVESTIGATING OFFICERS. 
I t is within the d i sc re t ion of the t r i a l court to determine 
t h e s u i t a b i l i t y of e x p e r t t e s t i m o n y in a case and the 
qua l i f i ca t ions of the proposed expert wi tness . State v. Claytonf 
646 P.2d 723 (Utah 1982); State v. Espinoza, 723 P.2d 420 (Utah 
1986). In the absence of a clear showing of abusef i t s decision 
wil l not be reversed. Lamb v. Bangart, 525 P.2d 602 (Utah 1974). 
Rule 702 of the Utah Rules of Evidence r e q u i r e s t h a t an 
e x p e r t must be q u a l i f i e d by "knowledge, s k i l l , e x p e r i e n c e , 
t r a in ing , or education" and that the cou r t determine t h a t the 
"special ized knowledge" of the expert "will a s s i s t the t r i e r of 
fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in i s sue" . 
Rule 703 of the Utah Rules of Evidence provides tha t the opinion 
must be based on some facts or data "of a type reasonably re l ied 
upon by experts in the pa r t i cu la r f ie ld in forming opinions". 
In t h i s c a s e , t he t r i a l c o u r t a l l o w e d one of t h e 
inves t iga t ing o f f i ce r s , Daniel Haggin, to render expert opinions 
on the reconstruct ion of t h i s c o l l i s i o n and the respect ive r i gh t -
of-way of the p a r t i e s . The t r i a l court allowed defendants to 
e l i c i t these opinions on both cross-examination of Haggin during 
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p l a i n t i f f s ' case in c h i e f (R. 8 7 3 , p p . 195-216) and d u r i n g 
defendant A l l e n ' s case in ch i e f (R. 874, pp. 492-512; R. 875f pp . 
513-565) . 
As a Deputy Sher i f f for S a l t Lake Countyf he was an employee 
of one of the de fendan t s . He was t r a n s f e r r e d from the t r a f f i c 
d i v i s i o n s h o r t l y a f t e r t h i s c o l l i s i o n . T h e r e a f t e r , he was a 
b u r g l a r y d e t e c t i v e for a y e a r , and for two y e a r s p r i o r to h i s 
t e s t i m o n y in t h i s c a s e he was a u n i f o r m p a t r o l o f f i c e r , 
responding to " t h e f t , b u r g l a r i e s , and scene c r i m e s " . (R. 875 , 
pp . 546-547) . 
P r io r to t h i s a c c i d e n t , Haggin had only taken one two-week 
course t h a t got i n t o a c c i d e n t r e c o n s t r u c t i o n a t N o r t h w e s t e r n 
Un ive r s i t y Tra f f i c I n s t i t u t e , which he termed a " t e c h n i c a l motor 
v e h i c l e acc iden t i n v e s t i g a t i o n school" (R. 873, p . 197; R. 875, 
p . 5 5 1 ) . In 1 9 8 6 , he a t t e n d e d an " a d v a n c e d a c c i d e n t 
i n v e s t i g a t i o n course" through Utah Peace Off ice rs Standards and 
T r a i n i n g (R. 873 , p . 1 9 7 ) . His t r a i n i n g has in f a c t been 
p r i m a r i l y in DUI d e t e c t i o n and a r r e s t s (R. 873, p . 197; R. 874, 
pp . 553-554) . 
His foundat ional tes t imony p r i o r to being dec la red an exper t 
i n c l u d e d no i n f o r m a t i o n a b o u t t r a i n i n g i n a c c i d e n t 
r e c o n s t r u c t i o n . He did claim t h a t he had t e s t i f i e d hundreds of 
t imes on how a c c i d e n t s had o c c u r r e d (R. 8 7 3 , p . 1 9 9 ) , b u t he 
c o n s t a n t l y , and we submit d e l i b e r a t e l y , throughout h i s t e s t imony , 
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confused h i s knowlege and experience in accident inves t iga t ion 
with his knowledge and experience in acc iden t r e c o n s t r u c t i o n . 
Haggin himself l a t e r admit ted t h a t t he re was a s i g n i f i c a n t 
difference between accident reconstruct ion and accident reporting 
and inves t igat ion (R. 875, p . 553). 
In sp i t e of the lack of evidence of educational background, 
the cou r t determined t h a t Haggin was a q u a l i f i e d expe r t on 
causation (R. 873, p. 199). Counsel for the s t a t e posed the 
quest ion: "Who had the right-of-way to enter t h i s in t e r sec t ion?" 
P l a i n t i f f s 1 counsel objected on the basis of lack of foundation, 
t ha t i t was beyond the scope of d i r ec t examination, and that i t 
cal led for a legal conclusion. These objections were overruled 
by the cour t , and Haggin was allowed to express the opinion as 
follows (R. 873, p . 206): 
"With that particular intersection, it would 
be the vehicle traveling Northbound to make 
the left hand turn onto 1-215." 
Later, in chambers, counsel for plaintiffs again objected to 
Haggin1s qualifications as an expert and notified the court that 
Haggin was not able to reconstruct the accident, even after 
enlisting a high school physics teacher to help him (R. 873, p. 
216). 
When counsel for defendant Allen called Haggin as his first 
witness on defendant's case in chief, he presented no further 
foundation for Haggin1s testimony. He was again asked to express 
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numerous op in ions about the acc iden t in q u e s t i o n . Again, counsel 
for p l a i n t i f f s objected on the b a s i s of lack of founda t ion (R. 
874 , p . 5 0 0 ) . Haggin was a l lowed to g i v e h i s o p i n i o n t h a t 
defendant Allen was in no way r e s p o n s i b l e for the a c c i d e n t , t h a t 
p l a i n t i f f s ' decedent ran the s top s ign and f a i l ed to y ie ld the 
r igh t -o f -way to Mr. Al len , and t h a t even i f she did not run the 
s top s i g n , Allen had "abso lu t e " r i g h t - o f - w a y . (R. 875, pp . 499-
503). Copy in Appendix B i s a t t a c h e d . Haggin a lso opined t h a t 
the speed of the Honda a t impact was 40 mph and the t ruck 30-3 5 
mph (R. 874, p . 506) . 
C o n s i s t e n t w i th t h e r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s of p l a i n t i f f s counsel 
p r i o r to t h e t e s t i m o n y of H a g g i n , he a d m i t t e d on c r o s s 
examination t h a t he had spent over 40 hours "working, a t tempt ing 
to use a l i n e a r conse rva t ion of momentum formula" to r e c o n s t r u c t 
the acc iden t and had not been ab le to c a l c u l a t e the ac tua l speed 
of the v e h i c l e s a t impact. He had even con tac ted a high school 
p h y s i c s teacher and s t i l l was not ab le to do the c a l c u l a t i o n s . 
The speed t h a t he obta ined from h i s formulas was 250 mph (R. 875, 
pp . 525-526) . 
His incompetence to t e s t i f y in these a r ea s i s c l ea r from the 
f a c t t h a t he was a t t e m p t i n g to use l i n e a r c o n s e r v a t i o n of 
momentum alone to r e c o n s t r u c t the c o l l i s i o n . P l a i n t i f f s ' exper t 
t e s t i f i e d t h a t e q u a t i o n s of angular momentum have to be used in 
a d d i t i o n to l i n e a r momentum. Linear Momentum i s only proper when 
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you have l i n e a r mot ion and i s not adequate where the acc iden t 
involves a sp in ou t or some r o t a t i o n as t h i s c o l l i s i o n did (R. 
876, p . 701) . 
H a g g i n ' s t e c h n i c a l t r a i n i n g o t h e r t h a n a two week 
" i n v e s t i g a t i o n " seminar p r i o r to t h e c o l l i s i o n and a seminar 
af terward was a b a s i c s phys ics c l a s s and Mathematics 101 a t the 
U n i v e r s i t y . 
I t i s c l e a r from the following exchange t h a t the b a s i s for 
Haggin ' s op in ions was not the measurements he had made a t t h e 
a c c i d e n t s c e n e . I t i s u n d i s p u t e d he d id no t know how to 
c a l c u l a t e from t h e s e . His o p i n i o n s were not r e a l l y based on 
any th ing , as the fol lowing exchange amply i l l u s t r a t e s a t R. 875 f 
p . 528: 
Q. Why did you say ye s t e rday those were the 
s p e e d s when you t e l l me [now] you 
c o u l d n ' t c a l c u l a t e the speeds? 
[Discuss ion on over ru led o b j e c t i o n o m i t t e d . ] 
The Witness : In answer to Mr. P l a n t ' s 
q u e s t i o n s , i t was based on op in ion and 
from p a s t e x p e r i e n c e . 
Q. Where do the numbers come from? 
A. They ' r e j u s t approximates t h a t I ' v e seen 
happen before on the same time type of 
c i r c u m s t a n c e s . 
Q. They j u s t come out of your head? 
A. No, S i r , they d i d n ' t ' j u s t come out of 
my head. 
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Q. Where do they come from? 
A. Past experience, investigating thousands 
of accidents. 
Q. Do you have a study or compilation you 
took that from? 
A. No. 
Q. Do you have a book? 
A. No. 
In other words, Haggin1s opinions were pure speculation. 
Since they were not based on anything in the record, it was 
incumbent on counsel proffering his testimony to lay a foundation 
that what he was relying on was reasonably relied upon by experts 
in the field. No such foundation was ever laid. 
This testimony was utterly outrageous. It was elicited by 
counsel for defendants. In a case where the jury has to rely 
upon experts to get an idea of what happened at the scene, it was 
thoroughly prejudicial to parade Haggin into the courtroom in his 
deputy sheriff uniform and present him as an authority on what 
happened and who had the right-of-way. He had no more idea what 
happened than the jury members themselves. It is impossible to 
know who had the right-of-way unless you have an idea of where 
the vehicles were prior to the collision. 
Recognizing Haggin as an expert in accident reconstruction 
constitutes a new low in trial practice. It was a clear abuse of 
discretion to allow this testimony. His testimony was admitted 
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without a proper foundation ever being laid as to both his 
qualifications and the basis for the opinions. There can be no 
doubt that his opinions were highly prejudicial. 
POINT IV. 
IT WAS PREJUDICIAL ERROR FOR THE 
TRIAL COURT TO DENY PLAINTIFFS AN 
OPPORTUNITY TO FULLY REBUT 
DEFENDANT'S EXPERT. 
Newell K n i g h t , a r e t i r e d Highway P a t r o l O f f i c e r , was 
presented as an expert witness by defendant Allen during his case 
in ch ief (R. 875-876, pp . 601-699) . The d e p o s i t i o n of t h i s 
witness was not taken, so t h i s testimony was heard by p l a i n t i f f s 
for the f i r s t time a t t r i a l . Mr. Knight had o r ig ina l ly been 
hired by the State of Utah as i t s expert wi tness . 
Mr. Knight expressed the opinion that p l a i n t i f f s ' decedent 
did not stop at the stop sign. He based tha t opinion p r inc ipa l ly 
on the testimony of E l l i s (R. 875, p . 627). From that uncertain 
testimony about the r e l a t i v e pos i t ions of E l l i s ' and decedent 's 
v e h i c l e s p r i o r to the c o l l i s i o n , Knight went to the scene and 
located some points on 1-215 and Wasatch by sight that he claimed 
were those ind ica ted by E l l i s . He then walked back from the 
in te rsec t ion to his two points and measured the d i s t a n c e s (R. 
875, pp. 632-636). The following exchange then took place (R. 
875, p . 636): 
Q. Did you pick a spot? 
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A. No. I came out from the d r iveways . He 
[ E l l i s ] picked the s p o t , then I came out 
from the driveways and said t h a t must be 
what i t i s because you can see driveways 
in t h a t a rea of the photograph. I c a n ' t 
do any b e t t e r than what he d i d . 
Q. So you used h i s spo t f in o ther words? 
A. S u r e . Then wi th t h a t I then used the 
f ac t we can p r e d i c t how long i t t akes a 
v e h i c l e to s t o p . 
D e f e n d a n t ' s e x p e r t has now c o n v e r t e d E l l i s ' i m p r e c i s e 
information about l o c a t i o n of the v e h i c l e s to p r e c i s e , measured 
d i s t a n c e s on the roadways. E l l i s ' range of p o s s i b l e l o c a t i o n has 
now became a " s p o t " . 
Knight then assumed an average speed of 35 mph for E l l i s to 
t r a v e l the now p r e c i s e d i s t a n c e and concluded t h a t Mrs. Randle 
did not have time to s t o p f using assumed speeds , assumed stopping 
t ime f look f and s t a r t up time to reach the speed a t impact of 19 
mph. "So I assumed she ran the s top s i g n . " (R. 875, pp . 636-
637). 
Knight has now conver ted E l l i s ' speed e s t ima te of 20-25 mph 
up the turn to Wasatch to an average speed of 35 mph. He then 
went through the same process using rough e s t i m a t e s by defendant 
Allen of d i s t a n c e , assumption of speeds of the Honda and t r u c k , 
and c o n v e r t i n g them to p r e c i s e measu remen t s t h a t were even 
i n c o n s i s t e n t w i th A l l e n ' s rough e s t i m a t e and t h e n d r a w s a 
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v i r t u a l l y u n i n t e l l i g i b l e c o n c l u s i o n f rom a v i r t u a l l y 
u n i n t e l l i g i b l e a n a l y s i s t h a t : 
"So whatever speed you a s s i g n to each one of 
these you came back and work i t , and then you 
work i t b a c k w a r d s and i t d o e s n ' t make a 
d i f f e r e n c e . I f she s t opped for t h e s t o p 
s ign f i f she ran the s top s ign she s t i l l got 
t he r e a t the same t ime. And you look a t the 
r e l a t i v e p o s i t i o n . " (R. 875 r p . 648) . 
P l a i n t i f f s were e n t i t l e d to respond to t h i s tes t imony. As 
no ted a b o v e , t h e d i r e c t and c r o s s e x a m i n a t i o n of Mr. Knight 
occupied almost 100 pages of t r a n s c r i p t . Much of i t i s v e r y 
t e c h n i c a l and was almost s u r e l y u n i n t e l l i g i b l e to the j u r y . To 
put i t c r u d e l y , i t was a "snow j o b " . 
The normal way to respond to the tes t imony of an exper t i s 
through tes t imony of a n o t h e r e x p e r t . P l a i n t i f f s , t h e r e f o r e , 
c a l l e d Dr. Watkins to the stand a f t e r defendant had res ted h i s 
case (R. 701-708) . The fol lowing exchange occurred (R. 876, p . 
704-705): 
Q. (By Mr. Denmer) Do you agree with Mr. 
K n i g h t ' s c o n c l u s i o n s t h a t Mrs. Randle 
must have run the s top s i g n . 
Mr. P l a n t : Ob jec t ion . 
The C o u r t : I b e l i e v e he a l r e a d y 
t e s t i f i e d to t h i s on d i r e c t when he was 
c a l l e d as a wi tness e a r l i e r . I t h ink he 
t e s t i f i e d to h i s opin ion about t h i s . 
Mr. Deamer: Yes. 
The Court: I'll sustain the objection. 
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Q. (By Mr. Deamer) Dr. Watkins f do you 
agree or disagree with the quest ion of 
the angle of view of Mr. E l l i s? 
Mr. P l a n t : O b j e c t i o n , i m p r o p e r 
r e b u t t a l . He ce r t a in ly could have done 
tha t as par t of h i s case in chief. 
The Court: Sustain the object ion. 
These questions by counsel were p e r f e c t l y l e g i t i m a t e for 
r e b u t t a l e x a m i n a t i o n . The c o u r t ' s r u l i n g s t h a t t h i s was 
testimony Dr. Watkins had covered on d i r e c t during p l a i n t i f f s ' 
case or that i t should have been covered are obviously in e r ro r . 
The questions were directed to Knight 's testimony. P l a i n t i f f s 
and Dr. Watkins heard that testimony for the f i r s t time after Dr. 
Watkins had been on the stand. 
The t r i a l court was unjust i f ied in l imit ing the testimony of 
p l a i n t i f f s ' exper t on t h i s important s u b j e c t . The ju ry was 
en t i t l ed to know tha t Dr. Watkins disagreed with Knight and the 
reasons why. For the reasons stated e a r l i e r , the testimony of 
the p a r t i e s ' experts was the only evidence of what happened. To 
l i m i t p l a i n t i f f s ' r e b u t t a l of d e f e n d a n t ' s exper t was h igh ly 
pre judic ia l to p l a i n t i f f s ' case. 
The t r i a l judge was obviously anxious to get t h i s case over 
with. One of the jurors had e a r l i e r complained to him that the 
t r i a l was causing a problem with h is job (R. 873r pp. 211-212). 
This was no proper j u s t i f i c a t i o n to t r u n c a t e p l a i n t i f f s ' 
leg i t imate rebut ta l testimony. 
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The Utah Supreme Court has held t h a t r e b u t t a l evidence i s 
t h a t which t e n d s to r e f u t e f or t o modify or e x p l a i n , a s to 
n u l l i f y and minimize the e f f e c t of the opponents ev idence . Board 
of E d u c a t i o n of South S a n p e t e v . B a r t o n , 617 P .2d 347 (Utah 
1980) . The t r i a l c o u r t ' s r e f u s a l to allow a w i tne s s to p r e s e n t 
r e b u t t a l e v i d e n c e whose c l e a r p u r p o s e i s to c o n t r a d i c t and 
d i s p r o v e evidence presen ted by the opponent i s e r r o r . Morrison 
v . M r C a l i f o r n i a , 699 P. 2d 600 (Nev. 1985) . In order to be 
r e v e r s i b l e , t h e e r r o r must r e s u l t in p r e j u d i c e . Board of 
Educat ion of South Sanpede v . Bar ton , 617 P.2d 347 (Utah 1980) . 
POINT V. 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY FAILING TO 
GRANT A MISTRIAL OR TO PROPERLY 
I N S T R U C T THE JURY REGARDING 
PREJUDICIAL COMMENTS BY COUNSEL FOR 
DEFENDANT ALLEN. 
P r e j u d i c i a l comments t o a j u r y a r e no t a g r o u n d s for 
r e v e r s a l u n l e s s t h e c o u r t d e t e r m i n e s t h a t t h e y a f f e c t t h e 
fundamenta l f a i r n e s s of the t r i a l and t h a t a d i f f e r e n t r e s u l t 
might have occurred if the comments had not been made. Jones v . 
C a r v e l l , 641 P.2d 105 (Utah 1982) . 
The comments by p l a i n t i f f ' s counsel were obv ious ly an appeal 
to sympathy and a c l e v e r l y worded a p p e a l for t h e j u r y to p u t 
t h e m s e l v e s in the p l a c e of t h e d e f e n d a n t . Such a p p e a l s a re 
improper . See Mew Son Leong v . Honolulu Rapid T r a n s i t Company, 
472 P.2d 505 (Hawaii, 1970) . We do not expect t h a t t h i s c o u r t i s 
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going to reverse the trial court on this issue. However, these 
comments were a preface to the constant string of errors invited 
by counsel for defendant Allen throughout the trial. We submit 
that these comments deserve, if not a reversal, at least the 
condemnation of this court so that aggressive counsel who have 
trouble confining themselves to the bounds of proper advocacy 
might be reminded and instructed as to what those boundaries are. 
CONCLUSION AND RELIEF REQUESTED 
The trial court committed a number of prejudicial errors. 
These were all invited by counsel for defendant Allen. The 
result of these errors was that the plaintiffs were not accorded 
a fair trial, and we respectively request the court to reverse 
the judgment and remand the actions to the district court for a 
new trial against the defendant Allen. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 20th day of June, 1991 
RANDLE & DEAMER, P.C. 
Stephen R. Randle 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs and 
Appellants 
4SBSRR.706 
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APPENDIX A 
JURY INSTRUCTION NO. 
(a) The Motor Vehicle Laws of Utah provide that a person 
may not turn left on a roadway until the turn can be made with 
reasonable safety and an appropriate signal has been given 
continuously for at least three (3) seconds preceding the 
beginning of the turn. 
(b) In addition the Motor Vehicle Laws provide that a 
driver intending to turn to the left shall yield the right-of-way 
to any vehicle approaching from the opposite direction which is 
within the intersection or so close to the turning vehicle as to 
constitute an immediate hazard. 
U.C.A. §§41-6-69(1) and 41-6-73 (Before 1987 Revisions). 
>f 
\ # 
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INSTRUCTION NO. *9~ *\ *S 
Every driver of a vehicle approaching a stop sign shall 
stop at a point nearest the intersecting roadway where the driver 
has a view of approaching traffic on the intersecting roadway 
before entering it. After having stoppedf the driver shall yield 
the right-of-way to any vehicle in the intersection or 
approaching on another roadway so closely as to constitute an 
immediate hazard during the time when such driver is moving 
across or within the intersection or junction of roadways. 
V> U O r.j ^J 
INSTRUCTION NO. >2«- * V \ 
In the event that a driver, after having driven past a 
stop sign, is involved in a collision with a vehicle having 
right-of-way in the intersection, such collision shall be deemed 
prima facie evidence of the first driver's failure to yield the 
right-of-way. 
Failure to yield the right-of-way to one whom the law 
has given the right-of-way is negligence. Therefore, if you 
believe that Rosan Randle failed to properly yield the 
right-of-way to the vehicle driven by Carl Hunter Allen, such 
conduct would constitute negligence on the part of Rosan Randle. 
INSTRUCTION NO. J2r\^~ 
When the law says that one person has the right-of-way 
over another, it simply means that such person has the immediate 
privilege of occupying the space in question and other persons 
must yield to such person. 
Failure to yield to one to whom the law has given the 
right-of-way is negligence. Unless circumstances resulting from 
causes beyond the control of the driver or pedestrian are such as 
to excuse and justify him in such failuref judging his conduct in 
the light of what a person of reasonable and ordinary prudence 
would have done under similar circumstances. 
f- <r> J~» O O 
INSTRUCTION NO. Si4^ *? ' 
In law we recognize what we term as unavoidable or 
inevitable accidents. These terms do not mean literally that it 
was not possible for such an accident to be avoided. They simply 
denote an accident that occurred without having been proximately 
caused by negligence. Even if such an accident could have been 
avoided by the exercise of exceptional foresight, skill or 
caution, still no one may be held liable for injuries resulting 
from it. Both negligence and proximate cause, as defined in 
these instructions, are requisites for finding liability. If you 
find from the evidence in this case that the accident occurred 
without negligence on the part of a defendant, or was not 
proximately caused by any negligence on the part of that 
defendant, that defendant cannot be held liable, and that 
defendant is entitled to your verdict in its favor. 
v7 -> 
TERRY M. PLANT, #2610 
HANSON, EPPERSON & SMITH 
Attorneys for Defendant Allen 
4 Triad Center, Suite 500 
P. 0. Box 2970 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110-2970 
Telephone: (801) 363-7611 
By. 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
STEPHEN R. RANDLEf Individually 
and as Guardian for Nathan 
Randle, Sarah Randle and 
Spencer Randle, Minor Children, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
UTAH DEPARTMENT OF 
TRANSPORTATION, STATE OF UTAH, 
SALT LAKE COUNTY COMMISSION 
and CARL HUNTER ALLEN, an 
Individual, 
Defendants. 
SECOND AMENDED JUDGMENT 
ON VERDICT 
2lL\2%l\ 
Civil No. C85-7216 
Judge Frank Noel 
The above-entitled matter came on regularly for trial 
before a jury in the court of the Honorable Frank Noel, judge of 
the Third Judicial District Court, on August 8, 9, 10, 11, and 
15, 1988; plaintiff Stephen R. Randle, individually and as 
guardian for Nathan Randle, Sarah Randle and Spencer Randle, 
minor children, having appeared in person and by and through his 
counsel, Michael Deamer, and the defendant, Carl Hunter Allen, 
having appeared in person and by and through his counsel, Terry 
M. Plant, and evidence having been produced on behalf of the 
plaintiff and the defendant, and the Court having duly 
impaneled the jury and instructed the jury on the law applicable 
to issues raised upon the pleadings of the parties, and the 
Court having submitted said issues to the jury on a special 
verdict, and counsel having argued on behalf of their respective 
parties, and the jury having thereupon retired to consider the 
matter, after deliberation thereon, the jury returned a special 
verdict as follows: 
We the jurors in the above-entitled 
case, for our special verdict answer the 
questions propounded to us as follows: 
1. At the time and place and under the 
circumstances of this case, was the 
State of Utah negligent in the design, 
construction or maintenance of the 
intersection of Wasatch Boulevard and 
1-215? 
Answer: Yes. 
2. If you answered question number 1 in 
the affirmative, was the negligence of 
the State a proximate cause of the 
accident in question and the death of 
the decedent, Rosan Randle? 
Answer: Yes. 
3 • At the time and place and under the 
circumstances of this case, was Salt 
Lake County negligent in design, 
construction or maintenance of the 
intersection of Wasatch Boulevard and 
1-215? 
Answer: Yes. 
4. If you have answered question number 3 
in the affirmative, was the negligence 
of Salt Lake County a proximate cause 
of the accident in question and the 
death of the decedent, Rosan Randle? 
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Answer: Yes. 
At the time and place and under the 
circumstances of this case, was the 
defendant Carl Hunter Allen negligent? 
Answer: No• 
If you have answered question number 5 
in the affirmative, was the negligence 
of Carl Hunter Allen a proximate cause 
of the accident in question and the 
death of the decedent, Rosan Randle? 
Answer: No. 
If you have answered questions 1 and 2, 
3 and 4, or 5 and 6 in the affirmative, 
then answer the question below: 
At the time and place in question and 
under the circumstances of this case, 
was the decedent, Rosan Randle, 
negligent? 
Answer: Yes. 
If you have answered question number 7 
in the affirmative, then state whether 
or not the negligence of the decedent, 
Rosan Randle, was a proximate cause of 
her death. 
Answer: Yes. 
Considering that all the negligence, if 
any, you have found to be a proximate 
cause of the accident should total 
100%, now allocate the negligence 
among those, if any, you have found 
were negligent. If you have answered 
that none of the defendants were 
negligent, or that none of the 
defendants' negligence was a proximate 
cause of the accident, you should not 
answer this question, but if you do 
answer this question, the total 
negligence must equal 100%. 
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Rosan Handle 80% 
State of Utah 9% 
Salt Lake County 11% 
Carl Hunter Allen 0% 
10. If you did not answer question number 9 
above, or iff in question number 9 
above, you have allocated 50% or more 
of the negligence to Rosan Randle, you 
need not answer question number 11 
below. Otherwise, answer question 
number 11. 
11. What amount of damages would adequately 
compensate plaintiffs as a consequence 
of Rosan Randle's death? 
Property and funeral damages $ 
General damages for loss of 
support of earning capacity, 
comfort, society and compan-
ionship of the decedent by 
Stephen Randle? $ 
by Nathan Randle? $ 
by Sarah Randle? $ 
by Spencer Randle? $ 
Total Damages $ 
12. Answer this question if, and only if, 
you have found Rosan Randle negligent 
and that her negligence was a proximate 
cause of the accident. 
What amount of damage would fairly 
compensate Carl Hunter Allen: 
a. for property and wage loss? $5,780.57 
b. for general damages? $ 0.00 
DATED this 15th day of August, 1988. 
FOREMAN 
Thereafter, the special verdict of the jury having 
been received by the Court and the jury having been polled as to 
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its answers to questions 5 and 7 of the special verdict and the 
above answers affirmed by all 8 of the 8 jurors, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the 
defendant, Carl Hunter Allen, is awarded judgment in his favor 
against the plaintiff for all claims made, NO CAUSE OF ACTION. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the 
judgment on the counterclaim previously entered in behalf of 
Carl Hunter Allen be amended to reflect an amount of $456.64, 
which sum represents cos1:s incurred by Carl Hunter Allen from 
the date of July 18, 1988, which date represents 10 days after 
an offer of judgment was filed by the defendant, Carl Hunter 
Allen, in the amount of $10,000. Said costs were mutually 
agreed upon by counsel for the defendant, Carl Hunter Allen, and 
Mr. Stephen Randle, who is presently representing himself and 
the other plaintiffs herein. The judgment on the counterclaim 
is hereby amended "due to the fact that Plaintiff has produced 
evidence that Defendant Allen, prior to trial, had been paid by 
Plaintiff's insurance carrier amounts at least equal to the 
amount awarded Defendant Allen by the,juryj 
DATED this 
BY THE COURT: 
 ]
O day of -Februaxy, 1990. 
HONORABLE FRANK NOEL 
-5-
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APPENDIX B 
1 EXPERT IN THIS MATTER. 
2 I'M NOT SURE WHAT THE COURT WOULD WANT ME TO 
3 DO AT THIS POINT IN TIME. I WOULD ANTICIPATE QUALIFYING 
4 HIM AS AN EXPERT WITNESS. I THINK SUBSTANTIAL TESTIMONY 
5 WAS GIVEN. 
6 THE COURT: I DON'T SEE ANY NEED TO GO 
7 THROUGH THAT. IF YOU WANT TO ADD TO THAT, YOU MAY 
8 CERTAINLY DO SO. 
9 Q. (BY MR. PLANT.) LET ME REFRESH A LITTLE BIT 
10 HOW MUCH TIME HAVE YOU SPENT TOTAL, IN ACTUAL REVIEW AND 
11 RECONSTRUCTION OF THE ACCIDENT IN QUESTION. 
12 A. THIS PARTICULAR ACCIDENT? 
13 Q. YES. 
14 A. IT WOULD BE RIGHT CLOSE TO 60 HOURS. 
15 Q. IS THIS ONE OF THE MORE THOROUGHLY 
16 INVESTIGATED ACCIDENTS THAT YOU'VE BEEN INVOLVED WITH, AS 
17 FAR AS YOU'RE CONCERNED? 
18 A. THIS WOULD RANK RIGHT UP WITH THE HARPER'S 
19 TRUCK ACCIDENT. 
20 Q. ONE OF THE TOP TWO THEN? 
21 A. RIGHT. 
22 Q. BUT MORE TIME AND EFFORT IN THIS ONE? 
23 A. I WOULD HAVE TO SAY I DID. 
24 THE COURT: WOULD YOU PULL THE MIKE CLOSER TO 
25 YOU. 
1 Q. (BY MR. PLANT) IN CONJUNCTION WITH YOUR 
2 INVESTIGATION OF THIS CASE, DEPUTY HAGGIN, HAVE YOU 
3 REACHED ANY CONCLUSIONS CONCERNING CAUSATION; WHAT MAY 
4 HAVE CAUSED THIS ACCIDENT? 
5 MR. DEAMER: I WOULD OBJECT. I THINK WE NEED 
6 MORE FOUNDATION IF WE COULD. 
7 THE COURT: OVERRULED. 
8 Q. (BY MR. PLANT) YOU DO HAVE OPINIONS 
9 CONCERNING CAUSATION. 
10 A. I DO. 
11 Q. DO YOU FEEL, BASED UPON YOUR INVESTIGATION OF 
12 THIS ACCIDENT THAT MR. CARL ALLEN IN ANY WAY CONTRIBUTED 
13 TO THIS ACCIDENT? 
14 A. ABSOLUTELY NOT. 
15 Q. DO YOU THINK THAT MRS. RANDLE, THE DECEDENT 
16 IN THIS MATTER, IN ANY WAY CONTRIBUTED TO THIS ACCIDENT? 
17 A. YES. 
18 Q. IN WHAT WAY DO YOU FEEL SHE CONTRIBUTED? 
19 A. RAN THE STOP SIGN AND FAILED TO YIELD THE 
20 RIGHT-OF-WAY TO MR. ALLEN. 
21 Q. IF IN FACT THE JURY OR SOMEONE WERE TO 
22 BELIEVE THAT SHE DID IN FACT STOP FOR THE STOP SIGN, 
23 ALTHOUGH I UNDERSTAND THAT'S NOT YOUR CONCLUSION; IS THAT 
24 CORRECT? 
25 A. THAT'S CORRECT. 
1 Q. IF IN FACT THAT WERE TO BE YOUR CONCLUSION 
2 SHE STOPPED FOR THE STOP SIGN, WOULD THAT HAVE ANY IMPACT 
3 UPON YOUR CONCLUSION THAT CARL ALLEN WAS NOT IN ANY WAY 
4 CONTRIBUTORY TO CAUSING THIS ACCIDENT? 
5 A. I'M NOT SURE I UNDERSTAND YOUR QUESTION. IT 
6 WASN'T VERY WELL WORDED. 
7 Q. WHAT I'M SAYING IS YOU'VE TOLD US HERE — YOU 
8 HAVE CONCLUDED THAT SHE HAD NOT STOPPED FOR THE STOP 
9 SIGN? 
10 A. THAT'S CORRECT. 
11 Q. WHAT I'M ASKING YOU, IF IN FACT SOMEONE WERE 
12 TO CONCLUDE THAT SHE DID STOP FOR THE STOP SIGN, WOULD 
13 THAT HAVE ANY IMPACT UPON YOUR TESTIMONY AS TO WHETHER OR 
14 NOT MR. ALLEN WAS AT FAULT IN THIS CASE? 
15 A. THE STOP SIGN REALLY HAS NO BEARING ON IT. 
16 Q. WHY IS THAT? 
17 A. IT'S THE FAILURE TO YIELD RIGHT-OF-WAY THAT 
18 CAUSED THE ACCIDENT. 
19 Q. AND I GUESS BASED UPON WHAT YOU'RE SAYING, 
20 SHE FAILED TO STOP OR SHE STOPPED AND FAILED TO YIELD THE 
21 RIGHT-OF-WAY, ONE OF THOSE TWO THINGS? 
22 A. THAT'S CORRECT. 
23 Q. THEREFORE, REGARDLESS OF WHAT SHE DID, I 
24 THINK AS YOU CALLED IT, A MOOT POINT, IN YOUR REPORT? 
25 A. THE STOP SIGN IS A MOOT POINT. IT'S THE 
1 FAILURE TO YIELD THE RIGHT-OF-WAY THAT'S THE CAUSE AND 
2 EFFECT. 
3 Q. DO YOU FEEL, OR BASED UPON EVERYTHING YOU'VE 
4 DONE, DO YOU SEE ANY WAY THAT MR. ALLEN COULD HAVE 
5 CONTRIBUTED TO THIS ACCIDENT? 
6 A. I DON'T. 
7 Q. DO YOU FEEL THAT IN ANY WAY HE DID SOMETHING 
8 THAT WOULD HAVE SOMEHOW RESULTED IN HIS LOSS OF ABSOLUTE 
9 RIGHT-OF-WAY TO ENTER IN THE INTERSECTION BEFORE THE 
10 RANDLE VEHICLE? 
11 A. MY INVESTIGATION HAS SHOWN THAT IN NO WAY HAD 
12 HE FORFEITED HIS RIGHT-OF-WAY. 
13 Q. WHEN YOU SET OUT TO DO THIS INVESTIGATION DID 
14 YOU SET OUT TO PROVE MR. ALLEN WRONG OR MRS. RANDLE 
15 WRONG? 
16 A. ABSOLUTELY NOT. 
17 Q. YOU'RE AN OFFICER FOR THE CITIZENS OF THIS 
18 COUNTY? 
19 A. EVERY CITIZEN, THAT'S CORRECT. 
20 Q. AND EVERYONE IS OWED THE SAME RIGHT OF 
21 ALLEGIANCE, SO TO SPEAK, ONE PERSON THE SAME AS THE NEXT, 
22 RIGHT? 
23 A. I WOULD HAVE TO SAY I TRY TO BE AS UNBIASED 
24 AS POSSIBLE. 
25 Q. DID YOU TRY TO DO THAT IN THIS CASE? 
1 A. I DID. 
2 Q. WAS YOUR GOAL, SO TO SPEAK, JUST TO FIND OUT 
3 WHAT HAPPENED? 
4 A. THAT'S WHAT I'M PAID TO DO. 
5 Q. IS THAT WHAT YOU THINK YOU'VE DONE? 
6 A. I BELIEVE I HAVE. 
7 Q. IN ADDITION TO CAUSATION — LET ME ASK YOU 
8 THIS: 
9 DID YOU PREPARE AND FILE OR ASSIST IN 
10 PREPARATION OF FILING OF AN INVESTIGATING OFFICER'S 
11 REPORT OF TRAFFIC ACCIDENT PURSUANT TO UTAH LAW? 
12 A. I DID. 
13 Q. LET ME HAND YOU WHAT'S BEEN MARKED AS EXHIBIT 
14 92, AND ASK YOU IF THAT DOCUMENT AND THE ACCOMPANYING 
15 DOCUMENTS REPRESENT THAT TRAFFIC REPORT? 
16 A. IT IS. . 
17 Q. AND THE LAST THREE TYPEWRITTEN PAGES WERE 
18 SPECIFICALLY PREPARED BY YOU, CORRECT? 
19 A. THEY WERE. 
20 Q. AND YOU ASSISTED — CORPORAL TERRY, ISN'T IT? 
21 A. YES. 
22 Q. IN PREPARATION OF THE FIRST THREE, FOUR 
23 PAGES? 
24 A. YES, THAT'S CORRECT. 
25 Q. YOU CONSULTED WITH HIM AND AGREED BEFORE HE 
